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Summary  findings
Would economic  growth be better if population growth  The real answer might be, "It depends on country
were slower?  conditions.' But this answer is uninformative unless  one
There are two apparently opposite answers to this  can show which country conditions 'it depends" on. Is it
question. Advocates  of policies  to reduce population  most harmful in poor countries?  In land-scarce
growth rates are completely  convinced  by the common  countries?  In countrics with poor policies?  ICing  and
sense  view that rapid population growth greatly hurts  Pritchett try to discover  the conditions  under which
economic  growth because  of scarcer natural resources,  population growth hurts economic performance  by
reduced investments  (per child) in health and education,  allowing  interactive terms for country conditions.
and lower rates of capital accumulation  per worker.  The empirical  results do not give confirmation  to any
The empirical  evidence (usually  marshalled  by  of the plausible  distinctions  across  country conditions-
economists)  provides an equally convincing,  and  the impact of population growth is not worse in poor
seemingly  contradictory, answer: There is no strong,  countries and is not worse in land-scarce  countries.  Their
stable relationship  between  countries' population growth  measure  of resource scarcity  may be one reason for this
and their per capita output growth rates.  failare to find an interaction, but while it failed  to
Iling  and Pricchett  propose an empirical  reconciliation  produce satisfying  results, it is a major conceptual
between the two views.  improvement  over even simpler indicators,  such as
No one really believes  that the impact of a 10-percent  population density, or the empirical  literatures  studied:
increase in population would have the same impact in  no interaction.
Bangladesh  as it would have in Canada, or even the same  Identifying  the conditions under which population
impact in crowded Malawi  or Rwanda as in sparsely  growth is a drag on economic  growth should be a
populated Zaire or Zambia. But if the impact of  priority as efforts to reduce population growth should be
population growth on economic  growth differs  across  concentrated in those countries where the efforts give the
countries, it might on average  be small (even statistically  greatest payoff.
indistinguishable  from zero) in the usual empirical
estimates,  even though the negative  impact in particular
countries might well be large.
This  paper-  a product  of the Po erty and Human Resources  Division,  Policy  Research  Deparunent  - is part of a larger  effort
in the department  to investigate  the causes  and consequences  of rapid  population  growth.  Copies  of the paper are available  free
from theWorld  Bank,  1818  H StreetNW,Washington,  DC  20433.  Please  contactSheila  Fallon,  room  NS-033,  extension  38009
(37 pages).  December  1994.
The  Polc  rtRearch  Working  Paper  Series  disseminates  the fndings of work in progress  to encourage  the exchange  of idcas  about
deuelopment iksze  An obectiveofthe  series isto get the findings outquicly,  even ifthe presentations are less tn  fully  polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and sbould  be used and cied  accordingly.'Thc fmdings  interpreations,  and condusions  are rhe
auths'  own and should  not be  attributed  to the World Bank, its Executive Board of Directors, orany  of its member countries.





Where in the World is Population Growth Bad?
Would welfare be improved if population growth were lower?  Specifically, as one part
output per workerl?  There exist two apparently opposite answers to this question. Advocates
of policies to reduce population  growtL rates (generally demographers) are completely  convinced
by  the common sense view that rapid population growth has large and deleterious effects on
economic growth through a number of obvious channels-increased resource scarcity, reduced
investments in  health and  education per  child,  and  lower  rates of  capital accumulation per
worker2. The  empirical evidence (usually marshalled  by  economists) provides an  equally
compelling,  and seemingly contradictory,  answer:  there  is no  strong,  stable, rela  ip
between  countries'  population  growth  and  their  per  capita  out  growth  rates.
In spite of the obvious  contradiction,  both  views  could be riht  This paper proposes  a
empirical  reconciliation of the  two views.  The  usual  staistical  method  for examning  the
relationship between growth and population (inear  regression) automafically  imposes  on the data
the  restriction that the incremenal  impact of population growth be the same in  all countries
Linear regression estimates this average impact  But no one really believes that the impact of
a 10 percent increase in population would have the same impact in Bangladesh or Kenya as in
Argentina or Canada.  If the impact of population growth differs across countries it might on
average be low (and even statistically indistinguishable from zero) even though the impact in
- Of course thcre are many other ways in which populahion  growdL  could worsen welfare  that  would not be
captured in exiing  economic statistics.  Effects through environmental  degrdaton  and congestion  would worsen
national welfare, but will be under recorded in national accounts.  Moreover this paper does not address the
potential spill-over affects from one's countries population or use of natural resources to another cuntry's  welfare,
as would be the case with greenhouse gas emissions.
2 The draft Programme of Action for the Intemational Conference on Populaion and Development  proclaimed
'general agreement  that persistent widespread povery  is iLfluenced by population growdh (para 3.1).3
particular  countries  might  well be quite high.  In that case the real answer  from previous  cross
national  evidence  on the impact  of population  growth may well be: it depends.
That  "it  dependsw  is the impact of population growth would be a very good answer if we
knew what it depends  on, but we don't.  Although  there are many plausible  assertions  made
(population  growth  is worse  in poor countries, or worse in resource  scarce  counties, etc) there
is litte  or no empirical  evidence. This paper attempts  to discover  the conditions  under which
population  growth  worsens  economic  performance.  The  population  growth-economic
performance  relationship  is examined  for various groups of counties defned by region, by
income class, and by a measure of land scarcity.  Unforftmately, we find no evidence that the
effect of population  growth  differs  in the expected  ways.  We believe  we point  the direction  in
which a convincing and useful reconciliation of the two snds  of evidence on the impact on
populadon must be found-a shifting of the population-growth relationship conditional on some
observable characteristic.  However, we fail in our quest to find a measurable vanable which
idenifies those counties where  population  growth will be bad.
Tle first section  reviews  the basic stylized  facts about population  growth  and economic
performance  and the existng empincal  literature. The second examies the econometrics  of a
varying slope parameter: The tbird introduces  the data and methods.  The fourth examines
variations  in the effects  of population  growth  and economic  groups  on average  and  across  groups
of countries,  by region, and by income  class, and by a measure  of land scarcity.4
I}  Existini empirical  evidence
There are tbree strands  of empirical  evidence  which have  failed to support  the common
sense view of the negative  economic  consequences  of population  growth.
First, there has been  at best a weak correlation  between  the rate of growth  of population
and GDP  per capita  growth  in the historical  experience  of the now  developed  countres. Kuznets
(1967)  surveyed  the very long growth  experience  of a number  of (now  developed)  countries  and
found  no correlation  between  population  growth and economic  performance. This  held  true even
excluding the areas of  recent setaement to reduce the impact of  endogenous  changes in
population  through  migraton responding  to economic  opportwity3.
Second,  economic  growth  and population  growth have  clearly  acceleratedjointly  over the
course of human history 4. Demogtaphers  have pointed out that world population  growth has
acceleated rapidly in recent centuries,  rsing from near zero anciently  to rates  above  2 percent
(before faling recently). Economists  have poited  out that growth rates of per capita income
have also accelerated  rapidly in the last centuries-especially  recently. As Kuznets  pointed out,
sice  current income  levels are the result of cumulative  economic  growth over past centaies,
the fact that many countries  began  only recentiy growing  rapidly  from a very low base suggests
3  lu the last  two centuies the "areas  of recent settlement'  have  had very rapid  grovwth  of both  population  and
GDP per capitaL  All counies were able  to sustain  very rapid rates of GDP  growth to allow  growth  per capita  to
be at least  as rapid  in the countries  with  very  rapid popuation  growth  as opposed  to the  demogaphically  more  stable
counuer-parn. It is difficult  to believe  that GDP per capita in the U.S. (or Argendna)  in 1930  would  have been
higher  had immigration  been  curtailed  in 1880, or 1820.
- 4  There is something  missing  in the argument  that since  population  is going to double  in the  next forty years
this necessarly iples  some  negative  consequences,  because  populaion gwth  doubled  in the  List  forty years-and
the last forty years are arguably  the best forty years for progress  in the history  of mankind.5
that current growth rates are much higher than growth rates in the far distant  past 5. Kremer
(1993)  provides  empirical  support  for the proposition  that, at least until the 1950s,  more rapid
world population  growth has been associated  with more, not less, rapid growth  in world  per
capita output.
Third, emining  the post-war experience of the developed  and developing  counties,
numerous studies have found no consistent, statistically significant, correlation (or pardtal
correlation)  between GDP per capita growth and population growth.  Literature surveys  by
Kelley  (1988),  Birdsall  (1988)  or the National  Academy  of Science  (1986)  typically  concludc  on
an ambivalent  note that the empirical  evidence  is not clear 7. Kelley's (1988)  statement,  which
fails to exclude  any possibility  for the impact of population  growth  (negative,  zero, or positive),
.D.
is typical:
. a bottom line assessment  can be offered.  Economic  growth (as measured  by per
capita output) in many developing countries would have been more rapid in  an
5  Although there is some debate about establishing a "subsistence" level  of income,  some  level of
per capita  output  is necessary  for demographic  sustainability-  The power  of compound  interest  is such  that, if poor
countries  had been growmg  over the "long  term" at anyding like the rates of the past fity years they  would  be
immensely  richer  than  they  actually  are.  That is, if output  had grown  by vea 1 percent  per capita  for 200 years
output would have increased  seven-fold. But if the calculations  of the "poverty  level" for the 1990  World
Development  report  are anywhere  near accurate epresetation of a bare miTnm  level, most of the low income
counties were more  like  2 or 3 time the bare minimum  in 1960. This implies  that  past growth,  on average,  must
have been considerably  slower  than 1 percent per annum.  Since growth in the post-war  period in developing
countries  has been roughly  2 percent  per annum,  current growth is faster  than historical  growth  by a multiple  of
at least three  or four.
6  Kremer,  in the whimsically  tided "Population  growth and technological  change: One milhon  B.C. to the
present"  extends  an argument  of Kuzaets  (1960)  about  the essentally "public  good"  (e.g. non-nvalrous)  nature  of
knowledge  with the assumption  that the producdon  function of knowledge  is cnstant  returns with respect to
population  (more  particularly,  the educated  population)  to argue  that worldwide  technical  ciange will  increase  with
increased populaLtion
7 Even  in the  United  Nations  Population  Fund's annual  report  State  of the World  Powulation.-1992  (an  inelly
source for ambivalence  on the negative  inpact of population  growth) one finds the assertion  'there was no
correlation,  negative  or positive  betwee economic  and  population  growth"  in the  period  up to 1980  (pg 8) (although
coupled  with a statement  that  this wasn't tme over the 19809  period).6
enviromnent of slower growth, although in a  number of countries the impact was
probably negligible,  and in some it may have been positive.
Or more recently, Cassen  (1994)  summarizes the state of the art,
Is seems likely  that, in a poor country ... a growth rate that doubles  the population  in 20
or 30 years would  hanm  the rate of improvement  in living  standards. But neither  iheory
no econometrics  has so far been able to demonstrate  this relationship  beyond doubt.
Table 1 summarizes  the estmates of the impact of population  growth  from the literature
using cross national  regressions 8. Population growth is not a robusdy significant  correlate of
per  capita output growth.  As with the  simple correlation, the partial correlations (linar
regression  coefficients)  after controlling  for other determinants  of economic  growth  (either  factor
accumulation)  or other factors (e.g., trade orientation)  are typically  small (most  estimates are
between -.14 and -.3)9 and only a few of the results are statistically  significant,  depending  on
the variable  definition,  country  sample, and time period.
8 The simple  bivariae correlaio  are not reviewed  here as there  is ample  dission  of those  in ocher  sources.
Winfrey, 1992,  provides  a summary  of carelation estimates  from various  countries  and  periods. Of  the 14 studies.
with estimates  for LDC samples  for various  periods  only 4 show  a statstically  significant  negative  relationship  (and
those are from  dLe more recent  periods).
9  Smallness,  like beauty  may  be in the eye of the beholder.  If tt  impact  of poplation growth  is .2 then a
1 percentage  point  decrease  in populaton growth would lead to a .2 percentage  point  decrease  in the per capita
growth rate.  About the largest  conceivable  reduction in population  growth  in developing  counties is about 2
percentage  points-which  is roughly  the  avaage population  growth difference  between  Sub-aa  Africa  of (2.8
percent) and the High income  countries  (.7 percent).  This enormous  (and implausible)  reductioa  in population
growth would  only accelerate  per capita  growth  by .4 percentage  points-an  effect  on growth  which  is dwarfed  by
the actual  observed  variation  in per capita  growth  rates in developing  counties. The  standard  deviation  of long-run
growth is about  2 percent so that  at an esdmate  of .2 a huge reduction  in population  growth  would  raise  per capita
growth by only about  one fif  of a standard  deviation.7
Table 1: Regression  estimates  of the impact of population  growth on the growth  rate of
per  capita  output.
Study  Estimate  t-statistic-  Period.
Levine and Renelt (1992)  -.15  .79  1960-85
._____________________________  (average)
Brander and Dowrick  (1994)  -.27  1.45  1960-85
(five  year
averages)
Kelley and Schmidt  (1994)a  .052  .63  1960-70
-.21  .16  1970-80
-1.32  3.2  1980-90
Barro (1991)  -.14  2.15  1960-85
Mazikw, Romer,  Weil (1992)  -.14  1.75  1960-85
Landau (1986)  . -.19  .93  1960-80
Ram (1986)  -.306  .87  1970-80
Kormendi  and Meguire  (1985)  -.42  - 2.47  1950-77
Notes:  The details  of each study  (e.g., definitions  of dependent  and independent
variable, estimation  method,  sample)  are included in Appendix  table Al.l  A
Coefficients  from the original  smdies have been transformed  so the reported  coefficient
represents  the impact  on the per capita growth rate of a 1 percentage  point acceleration  in
population  growth.
a)  Estimates  are inclusive  of interaction  effects with level of income  per capita, while t-
statistics  are for slope  term alone.
The  small and  insignificant effect  of  population  in  regression  estimates are  often
dismissed entirely by saying that the results are  "difficult  to interpret" or that "not much is
leamed" from country level aggregate  studies which show a lack of correlation. While the
studies may not have empirically  confirmed  the common  sense  view, and certainly  have some
deficiencies,  these studies  do establish  two facts.  First, on average, across countries  and time
periods, the higher  population  growth  is not associated  with significantly  less rapid  growth  rates8
of output per capita.  Although  this may not translate into any direct statement  about the
causation  and structure  the (near) lack of correlation is an observed  fact that reasoning  about
population  growth must accommodate.
Second,  variations  in population  growth rates explain  very little  of the variation  in growth
rates across countries.  Not surprisingly, countries' economic  growth rates vary for many
reasons besides  population  growth  so that many low population  growth countres also had low
per capita growth  while  many  high  population  growth countries  also  had high per capita  growth.
Table 2 presents those developing  countries which were in the bottom third of the sample in
growth rate of populaton gnd  output  per capita and those in the top third for both. Moreover,
these examples  are all for developing  counties.  Also, although  Asian  growth  superstars  is that
even  though  their population  growth'was  moderate for developing  countries,  they achieved  rapid
per capita growth even though  their population growth was very ranid relative  to the OECD
countries. Even if we can  establish  population  growth as an important  determinant  of economic
growth in some  situations,  variations  in populaton growth have  simply  not been  a myioQ  factor
in explaining  relative growth  perfonce.9
Table 2:  Countries  with low population  growth and poor performance  and countries  with
high population  growth  amd  good performance.
Countries  with low population  growth  Countries  with high population  growth (top
(bottom  third) and poor performance  third) and good performance  (top  third)
(bottom third)  - .
Country  Population  Growth  Country:  Populadon  Growth
growth  output per  growth  output  per
worker  worker
Argentina  1.5-  1.1  Botswana  3.3  8.0
Chile  1.8  .1  Cote  3.9  2.7
Guinea-  1.7  .4  d'Ivoire
Bissau  Cameroon  2.8  4.6
jGuyana  1.1  -2.1  Congo  3.0  4.3
Haiti  1.8  .2  Algeria  2.9  4.2
Jamaica  1.8  .1  Ecuador  2.9  3.2
Sri L nka  1.8  .4  Gabon  3.3  7.7
Uruguay  .6  .9  Paraguay  2.9  2.8
Syria  3.4  -4.4
__________I  Tanzania  3.0  2.7
Note:  In this sample,  average  anumal  population growth  was 2.1 percent (wi:th  a standard
deviation  of 1.0) and average  growth  of per worker output  was 1.9 (with a standard
deviation  of 2.1).
Those are two  important  facts  that have  been learned  from growth  regressions.  This does
but this does leave two unanswered  questions. First, where is population  growth  bad?  The
iInpact for a particular  country or at a particular time is not necessarily  the average impact.
Some  low income  countries  such  as Bangladesh  appear  to be clearly  suffering  from overly  dense
population. Total  and arable  land  per agricultural  worker is extremely  low, and falling, and the
expansion  of population  onto increasingly  marginal lands leads to rapid erosion even of the
existing stock of productive  land and frequent natural calamities  as population  presses onto
marginal  lands. Second,  what causes  what? Since both populationgrowth  and economic  growth
affect each other and are affected  by other variables the association  (or lack thereof)  between-10
the two variables  does  not imply  anything  about tle structure  of causation  between  the variables.
The above facts imply that any simple assertion derived from Maithusian  (or Neo-
Malthusian)  theories  that  population  growth  will everywhere  and always  worsen  living  standards
must be wrong in at least some  country and historical  episodes. On the other  hand an assertion
that population is not a problem for economic growth anywhere seems also certain to be
incorrect, in spite  of the small  average  effect. This has led to the "revisionist t' (neo-Malthusian)
view, which seems to have emerged as the new consensus in some circles, that population
growth is harmful  to econonic progress only under certain conditionsl.  This, for instmace,  is
the conclusion  reached  by Cassen  (1994) in his recent survey  of the literature:
What  are the "new  conclusions"  to be drawn from all this? It seems  fairly clear
that population  growth  is not the overwhelming  affliction  that  some  have  claimed
and cerainly not the pjime cause of difficulties of development; but it also should
not be regarded  with equanimity. The degree of hindrance  to the improvement
of individual  living standards  that rapid population  growth is likely to afford is
hard to establish. It has not been helped  by economists'  models,  which give the
same result whether a country has a hundred or  a hundred million people;
whether  the population  is growing  fast or slowly;  whether  the country  is well-off
or poor; and whether or not it has good government  with sensible economic
policies,  equitable  income distrbution, well functioning  markets  and institutions
and efficient  agriculture  with scope for expansion.
.However  these "revisionist"  hypotheses about differences in the impact of population  across
types of countries,  although  attractive  and plausible,  have yet to be adequately  explored  or attract
any empirical  support.
The question is: if additional  policy effort were successful in reducing the national
ferdlity rate, would the result be higher lifetime output per person?  If the answer is not
10 This is the view reflected  in the 1984  World Development  Report,  (see also Birdsall,  1988)  as well as the
National  Research  Council  report  (NRC, 1986).uniformly yes or no (and if the answer is uniform, the answer  must be no) can the particular
conditions  and counties in which population  growth is bad be identified?
m  The siIple  econometrics  of interaction  effects
Before  examining  the differences  in the econometric esults  when  counties are grouped
by various categories,  a simple  review of what, empirically,  we are looking  for is useful. Say
the true model is:
Equation 1:  7 - I  E.  Z  iZ  *(*Z)  E
where lower case lettrs  represent  growth rates, so that y is growth  in output  per worker, I is
the growth rate of the labor force:$  and Z is some variable or set of variables  (e.g., resource
scarcity,  or income per capita) such that the  effect of Labor  force growth on output growth is
different depending  on the value  of Z.  In this model the effect  of I on output  per worker  growth
is not simply  p  for all countries  (as imposed  by the linear model), but rather
Equation  2:  ay =  + a*z,
If there are interactions,  the slope  of the y-I relationship  is not constant  across  countries. If the
slope is not constant  across  countries  then the coefficient  on labor force growth  in regressions
of y on I that did not include  Z could easily vary according  to the sample.
In uiarticular  one could separate the sample according  to the value of Z and ran the
regressions separately. For instnce if the true model were given by equation  1 (and if I and12
Z are uncorrelated)  then if we sorted the data according to the value of Z, divided  the sample
at some (arbitrary)  point z*, and ran two regressions:
Equation 3:  II  #  i  e if Z  <z
-,  ph  '  ej if Z1 >  Z*
The estimated value of  p 1 would converge  to:
Equation 4:  plal  L . *asi
where the mean  of z in equation  4 is'tkk  over only those vahes of Z less than the cutoff  point
Equation 5:  z*  -E(ZIZ  <z  C)
When the samples are divided based on the value of Z (the variable that ineracts with labor
force growth) the coefficient on I  in a  regression estimated without  the inclusion of  the
interaction  term will be'different.  The magaitude of the difference  between  thr coeffcient on
I in the samples  will depend  on the strength of the interacton effect and on the distibution of
Z.
This suggests  a method  for the search for the iustability  of the regression  coefficient  over
samples is to search  for a variable  to divide the sample and examme  whether  one finds  plausible
differences in the coefficients  across the two sub-samples. Although  m some  ways  dvdng  the13
in the interaction  term) there may be threshold effects.  The negative  impact of population
growth may  be very  small  up to a point and  then increase  dramatically.  Below  we  generally  use
the average  of possible  Z values  to divide the sample  as we have no particular  prior knowledge,
but there is no reason to expect the critical value above which population  consequences  are
severe corresponds  to the average. The combination  of average  slope  and cutoff  point  does put
some limits  on the values  of the paTameters  however, as if the slope  of the "worsew  half of the
sample is low, then either the slope even for the "worse"  cases really is low, or only a small
fraction of the countries  are in the "worse" case.
A mimerical  example  will illustrate  this point that even if the effect  is non-linear  in some
unknown threshold an arbiitary splitting of the sample should detect the relationship.  Say the
true model for the impact  of laborYforce  growth I on output per person  growth  y is non-linear
in some variable (liMe  resource scarcity, call it z) such tha  there is no effect up to some
threshold  lev,el  zA but that after z  the slope is incresing  in z.  The model would  be:
,  os1 +  r  zIz'
YIfSu{L.)  +e4"Ž
Now, as a example, asmne 1 and z are normally distributed  and uncorrelated  and that the
threshold point z'  is such that f percent of the observations  lie above the i.  If a linear
regression. on  the whole sample is  estimated,  the  coefficient will be  £ =  *(+'),  where
z  =m7aaz)  (z>z-*  Iff=.10  and  2  =  ,for  exanple,  £o.10*1_69  =338  If on the
other hand the sample is divided in half and the regression is run only on those observations14
other hand the saii2ple  is divided in half and the regression  is run only on those  observations
where z is above its mean  then this automatically  doubles  the fraction  of the sample  in which
the  slope is positive and hence raises the  estimated coefficient to  £ =.1*2.1.691(  =m6
Since the estimated  impact on the sample  in  the bottom half  of z values  is zero, the difference
between the estimates  depends  on the fraction  above the threshold  and the average  slope above
the threshold.  So, if the division of the  sample along characteristic  z  fails to produce
substantatively  different results  then either a very small fraction of the sample  lies above the
threshold  region  (which  does  not deny a threshold  above  which  population  growth  is detrimental)
or the difference  in impact above and below the threshold  is not very large (perhaps  because
characteristic  z (as measured)  is ibt really an important  interactive  term).  This result is true
whatever  the true functional  form of the increased  impact of population  growth.
lI  Data and Methods
Output  per worker  is taken  from the Penn World  Tables  5 (Summers  and  Heston, 1991).
Output is re2a  GDP measured  at 1985 "real'  dollars, that is adjusted  for variations  across
countries in purchasing  power. Output levels  using these PPP currency  conversions  should  be
comparable  over time and across countries"l.
Using labor force growth intead  of either population  growth (as most studies do) or
growth of  the working age population (ManLiw, Romer, Well 1992)  -is empirically and
conceptually  important. It is empirically  important  as it allows the decomposition  of changes
in output  per worker  into factor accumulation  and per worker  productivity,  which  is performed
1  Since  the focus  is on growth  rates, nothing  of substance  would  change  if World  Bank  constant  pice local
currency  GDP  data  were  used  as the  cross  country  correlations  in growth  rates  are very  high  beween  the  two sere..15
in  a companion paper (Pritchett, 1994).  Since the  correlation between the growth rate of
population and the growth rate of labor force  is not exceptionally high, the distinction may
matter in the estimationl2.
Concepulally the disinction  is also  important,  as most theories as to why population
growth should negatively affect welfre  growth are about its detimental  impact on the growth
of labor productivity, not its effect on labor force participation 1 3. There are two othffer  reasons
for preferring to focus on output per worker for welfare comparisons.  First, output per person
could change due to rapid population growth simply because of changes in the age structure of
the population, as dependency rates (ratio of those not in the labor force to those in the labor
force) vary subs  ally across counties  with different demographic  patteras.  Tis  implies that
even if lifetime income were the saimie  for each generation regardless of cohort size (output per
worker and participation  rates were constant), GDP per person would first rise and then fall with
a decrease in the birth rate-but with decidedly ambiguous welfare conseuences 14.
Second, for many reasons GDP per capita is an awful measure of welfar  (because it
doesn't take account of extmalities,  it doesn't account for the depletion of the stock of natural
capital, etc.) but in its usual uses GDP per capita is at least equally awful across comparisons
of two situations and hence the level of its awfulness does not affect the welfam comparisons
12 Regressing  Wabor  force  growth  1960-90  on population  growth  1960-90 ves an  2 of .65. For dedes
regressing  labor  force  grwth on population  growth  lagged a decade  produces  R  of .72 for  the 1980s  and .52 for
the 1970s.
13 There  is some evidence  that  most of even the modest  negative  effect  on output  per persn  of population
growth that  most studies  find is primarily  through  its effct  ont  labor force  paricipation (Brander  and Dowrick,
1994,  Pritchett,  1994).
14  The addition  of a wanted  child in a household  increases  welare but lowers output  per capita in the
household  substanialy.16
of changes. This is not the case for demographic  changes, as the lahor force  partcipation of
women typically (although  of course not necessarily) account for a large fcion  of home
production.  Since home production is not valued in GDP, marginal welfare gains from
increased labor force participation  of women are recorded as first order changes  in GDP per
capita.
In estmating the relationship  between the growth rate of output  per workerI 5 and the
growth rate of population  there are two approaches  to adding  control variables. The first adds
policy or structural  correlates  of growth to a reduced form equation. The second  begins with
a production  function  and controls for factor accumuladon. This paper only reports the first
approach. In order to provide consistency  across correlations  reported  we report the partal
correlation  coefficient  of I with y  in  tbree forms 16; a) bivariate,  with no control  varables, b)
using just initial  per capita  income  as a control variable, and c) including  other  policy  indicators
along withinitial income. The  policy indicators  included  are the blackmarketprmium (BMP),
financial depth (LLY, the rado  of  liquid liailiies  to  GDP), and openness (XS, the  ratio of
exports to GDP).  Since these other growth correlates are of only secondary  interest in this
exercise, all that will be reported is the pardal correlation  with population  after including  the
controls.
IS Al  growth  rates  ar  calculated  as least square growth  rates over the speifid  period.
16 That is even when  we are performig a bivariate  regression  we do not preset  the bivariate  conrelaon,
p  . but the coefficient  from the linear regression,  p  . In bivariate  regression  the relationship  is simply
p  =  *(aJ)  . Reporting  the slope  coefficient  rather than  the corelaion for  the bivariate  regressions  preserves
the scaug  for easier companson with the multivariate results.17
A second way of examining  economic growth, not pursued in this paper, is to specify
a production function  which would allow a decomposition  of the growth rate of output per
worker into  factor  deepening  (the  growth  of physical  capital  and education  stock  per worker)  and
TFP  growth:
y  =zr*k  + a,*h  'W
where k and h are the growth  rates of physical capital  per worker  and human  capital  per worker
respectively. Then  in order to estimate  the total impact of labor force growth  on output  growth
one needs to decompose  the effect between the effect of more rapid I on k,h, and TFP.  In a
companion  paper (Pritchett,  1994).  we use recently created data on the physical  capital stock
(Nehrlu  and Dhareshewar,  1993)  and years of schooling  (Nebru, Dubey,  Swanson,  1994,  Barro
and Lee 1993)  to calculate  this decomposition.  The result of which  is that  more  rapid  population
growth is not associated  with slower  growth  of capital  per worker, is not associated  with slower
growth of  the schooling of  the labor force,  and  is  mildly associated  with slower TFP
growth7.  This paper will focus  on the non-producton fimction  estimates.
Availability  of data  us to work with a sample  of 78 countries  of which  22 are OECD  and
56 are developing  (in this case developing  is defmed as non-OECD)  countries 18.
17 The real difficulty  with jmplemeuting  this approach  tumrns  out to be the estmation  of the impact  of factor
accumulation on growth as the augmented Solow model (a la Mankiw, Romer, Weil, 1992) imposes theoretical
restrictions on the coefficients (e.g.,  that they be equal to  factor shares in GDP) that the data have difficulty
supporting.  Pritchett (1994) is agnostic  about TFP measurement, using coefficients  both from esdmation and from
theory.
13  Except for Turkey, which is included as a developing country.18
Two final methodological  notes are about the use of OLS for estimation  and the time
horizon for growth rate calculation. Since labor force growth is in part determined  by income
growth, estimates  of ffie  income  growth-labor  force growth relationship  are potentially  affected
by their joint endogeneity. The estimates presented do not correct for this problem  for thre
reasons.  First, since labor force growth is by and large predetermined  by earlier population
growth (although  there are some participation  effects) the endogeneity  should  be less severe in
this case than in those studies  that use contemporaneous  population  growth. Second,  if more
rapid income  growth  reduces  population  growth then whatever  simultaneity  bias  there is should
bias  towards finding a more negative relationship.  Since the primaxy  puzzle is  that the
relationship is not as negative  as people expect, correcting this bias would only reduce the
already small  population  effect. Third, our experinentation  with  instumealvariables  estimates
(using eihr  lagged  labor force growth, lagged births or lagged child morality) gave similar
results-but  with significant  added imprecision  due to instrumenation.
Except for a smal seceon below, all the results reported are over the 30 year period
from 1960-199019.  There is a good reason.  If one is interested  in long-un relationships  the
use of high frequency  data is unlikely  to add much information. Earlier research  (Easterly, et
al, 1993)  has shown  that there is very litde persistence  of economic  growth  rates  across  periods
as  long as  a decade.  In  contrast, population growth rates change only quite slowly9 0.
Therefore, while moving to anmual  data or  5 year periods would add a large number of
19 Or as mach of that period  was  available. If data was only available  1962-1990  for instance,  we just used
the growth  rate over that shorter penod.
20 Even  in the ideal  situation  in which  population  was actually  observed  at high frequency.  In most  developing
county cases  much  of the  data  about  population  is interpolated  into  to create  complete  series  and  so cannot  represent
real information  useful  for estimation  in any case.19
observations this data would also add a great deal of noise relative to real information about the
relationship of interest between long-rnm  population and economic performance and hence is
unlikely to improve the estimates. That said, we produce and report results using ten year data
in a section below and in appendix tables.
IV)  Basic Results:  Labor force erowt  and out;ut  per wre
Tlable  3 presents the correlationms  of population and growth over the entire period.  The
three columns report three partial correlawion  coefficients; the bivariate partial correlation and
the multivariate partial correlation, controlling for just  initial income in one instance and for
other established policy growth correlates in addition to lagged income in anotber.  The bivariate
results are similar to the bulk of the previous literature of cross county  regressions: a small and
statistically insignfant  conrelation. Over the whole sample the correlation is slightly negative
(-.10), but insignificant, the p-value is *3721. Both sets of partal  correlations are nely  the
same as the bivariate correlations.  Adding our set of control variables (chosen from a review
of  the  literature  searching for  robust growth  correlates)  does not  change substantially the
estimated impact of labor force growth,  if anything, it reduces the estimated impac.
A)  Results by itujon
The first question is whether or not the effect of population growth varies across groups
of countries, defined either by region or income class.  Surprisingly, when the effect is allowed
21  Tkriughout  the paper the tables present  p-values,  which is the  si  aclevel  of the te  that the
coefficient is different from zero.  A p-value of  10 (.05 (.01)) for the partial corrlation  for instance is refered
to as rejecting the null hypothesis  of zero u  the 10 (5 (1)) pe:cent significance  level.
22  This is not suprising if the policy regimes  are uncorrelaed  (or only weakly corlated)  with labor force
growth as the excluded variable bias on the labor force growth coefficient would be zero.20
to vary across  developed  and developing  countries  we find all of the negative  effect  on economic
performance is in the OECD counties,  where the effect of labor force growth is strongly
negative and significant 23. On the other hand the estimated  effect in the developing  countries
is positive, .15, (although  insignificant). This seems to imply  that the slope of the economic
growth-population  growth relationship  depends is noE  constant  but that, contrary  to intuition,
labor force growth is worse for the richer industrialized  than developing  countries.
Table 3:  Partial Correlation of Labor Force Growth  with Growth Rate
of Output  per Worker, 1960-1990. Smiple divided by regions.
Control  None  YO  YO,BMP,LLY,XS
variables:
All  -.10  -.12  0.04  79
(.37)  (.28)  (.73)
OECD  -.50  -.08  -.04  22
(.02)  (01)  (.89)
Developing  0.15  0.16  0.10  56
l__________  (.25)  (.24)  (.48)
Africa  -.01  0.02  -.09  19
l__________  (.98)  (.93)  (.73)
Latin  0.32  0.33  0.50  18
America  (.20)  (.19)  (.07)
Asia/  0.60  0.66  0.75  12
Pacific  (.04)  (.03)  (.03)
Notes: p-levels  of the test for zero correlation  are in parenthesis.
23  This result is the same as Maniiw,  Romer, Weil find with the estimated mpat  higher and stascally
significant in the OECD (-.21) while smaller (-.14) in LDCs.21
The fourth  through  sixth  rows of table 3 show the impact  across geographical  regions  of.
the developing  world. The effect  is clearly worst in Africa-although  only because  it is slightly
(and isigficty)  negatie -.01, w  hile the other estimates  sre positive. In Latin  America  and
Asia/Pacific  the labor force growth  partial correlation  effect is actually  positive  (.50 and .75)
and statistically  significant  (at the 3 percent level for Asia and 7 percent for Latin America).
This is consistent  with other  studies  which tend to find the largest  negative  (although  not always
statistically  significant)  effects in Africa (see appendix table A1.1).  However  pure regional
effects  are always  somewhat  suspicious  as it would be pref&ble to identfy the empirical  feature
African  countries  share  that  produces  this effect rather than pacldng  it into the unexamined  label
of  U.Afri
The next logical  way  to divide the sample is by level of output per worker. Here, the
same puzzling result is found.  The impact of labor force growth is as bad (or worse in the
bivariate correlations)  in the middle  income countries  as in the low income  counties.  Table  4
shows that for both income groups the impact is very small (-.05 Middle, -.02 Low) and
emphatically  insignificant  (p-levels  of .82 and .94).  This finding  by income  group  is consistent
with Brander and Dowrick,  1994, who also find the estimated  impact of population  growth as
bad or worse in the ric  than the poorer countries 24. Keley  and Schmidt (1994) also
frequently  show a small  and insignificant  interaction  term which suggests  that countries  with
higher levels  of per capita  income  have a more negative  impact  of population  growth  that poorer
24  Brander and Dowrick use a search over Chow test values for sample separation to divide their sample by
per capita income at the statistically "optimal" point.22
counties.  Statements  that population  growth is worse in poorer countries  have  yet to attract
much, if any, empirical  support.
Table 4:  Partial Correlation  of Labor Force Growth  with Growth  Rate of
Output per Worker, 1960-1990. Sample divided by income dass.
Control variables:  None  YO,BMP,LLY,XS
All  -.10  -.12  0.04  79
(.37)  (.28)  (.73)
OECD  50  -.08  -.04  22
(.02)  (.07)  (.89)
Low Income  0.05  0.07  -.05  24
(.83)  (.75)  (.82)
Middle  Income  -.12  -.12  -.02  32
(.51)  (.53)  (.94)
Notes:  p-levels  of test for zero correlation  in parenthesis.
B) Results by land endowment  per rural individual
The previous results, dividing the sample  by region, level of development,  or income,
have not yet solved our puzzle  of discovering  for which group of countdes poplation growth
has  a  negative effect.  One possible rationale is that the level of resources available for
expansion  of production.is  more  important  than the level of income. While  population  expansion
may have a negative  effect in poor and land poor Bangladesh  it may not have the same impact
in poor, but land rich, Zambia. This resource depletion  effect  of population  growth  should  be
higher the larger the dependence  on natual  resources in fixed supply and the nearer the
25  Kley  and Schmidt (1994) table 3 shows negaxive  linear inraction  terms in the 1960's.and 1970's but a
small positive interaction term in the 1980s.  The results with interactioc terms using an LDC only sample are more
ambivalent  with a positive interaction term  in the  1960s and  1980s and a negative  term in the  1970s (appendix  table
C2):  All of the estimated interaction  terms (positive and negative) are stai.icaly  insignificant.23
exhaustion of possibilities for expansion at the extensive margin (that is, the lower the marginal
productivity of additional natural resources brought into production) 2 6.
However, quantifying  which countries are "resource poor" is elusive.  Simple population
density won't do.  Would more population growth be a good thing in Hong Kong or Singapore?
By any simple land density measure these are exceptionally "resource poor" economies yet both
have  had  relatively  rapid -population  growth  while  maintaining  extraordinary  economic
performance.
Pure agricultural potential won't do, as the composition of output affects the magnitude
of the effect on population as is clear in the case of the more advanced economies2 7. Since the
utilization of resources accounts for a very  small portion  of measured GDP in industrialized
countries the availability of land isunlikely  to be a major constraint to growth even in densely
populated Belgium. Also, agricultural  potential is a limited measure because land is not the only
resource.  Would more population growth be good or bad for economic growth in Saudi Arabia
(or any other small oil state) following a huge increase in wealth?  If capital accumulation is
unconstrained the factor shallowing effects of rapid population growth may not emerge.
Because (and in spite of) these considerations the measure we setde on in this paper is
"arable land per  rural -worker."  This  has  the benefit  over  population density of  (roughly)
26  For instance, Kelley (1988) suggest  "Population's adverse impact has most likely occured  where arable
land and water are particularly scarce or costly to acquire."
27  We did originally consider using the measure of 'caying  capacity" derived by FAO (FAO, 1984) which
calculates  the potential food production  per person based on data about soils and climates  and agricultural
productivity. However,  this suffers  the same difficulty  of land density  measures-that  densely  populated  highly
urbanized  areas  are classified  as having  population  in excess  of the land's carrying  capacity. For instance,  the ratio
of population  supporting  capacity  to actual  population  in 1975  in the intermediate  input  usage  case  was 1.31 for
Bangladesh,  1.67  for Egypt  (compared  to 44.88 for Zambia,  16.75 for Argentina)  but was  near  zero  for Singapore.
To use this as an indicator  of population  pressures would suggest much worse problems  in Singapore  -than
Bangladesh.24
excluding  sparsely  populated  because  mosdy uninhabitable  lands  (e.g. Libya)  and  also correcting
for the Hong Kong type situation  wit  high density but no rural population  and little or no
agricultural output from land in any case.  This measure does seem to capure part of the
distinction  as seen from table 5, which shows representative  land rich and land  poor countries.
There is huge variation  across  countries,  as the most land poor countries  have  only about  a tenth
the land as the land rich.  The rankings of land poor correspond  to intuition  as countries  like
Egypt, Indonesia,  and Bangladesh  show  up as extremely  dense. On the other  hand  there is more
uncertinty  about the land rich ranldngs, as the measr  of 'arability" must play a role for
suggesting  Botswana  is land rich.  The measure does seem to do a good job of dividing  up
Africa into land rich (e.g. Zambia)  and land poor (e.g. Liberia or Ghana  (678)). On the down
side, we had to delete  Singapore  from the land poor sample in an entirely  ad hoc way, as the
data recorded a rural population  and hene  it was classified as land poor.25
Table 5:  Representadtve  land poor and land rich countries  as classified  by arable  land per
rural person (in 1980).
Land Poor (more  than twice  the average  Land rich (less tWan  half the average
density)  density)
Country  Rural  population  per  Country  Rural population
square  arable  per square  arable
kdlometer  kilometer
Sri Lanka  1324  Botswana  56
lEgypt  1004  Zambia  66
Liberia  969  Brazil  67
Malaysia  904  Senegal  69
Bangladesh  846  Venezuela  81
Indonesia  810  Syria  87
Korea  796  Tunisia  95
Kenya  777  Bolivia  95
HXaiti  752  Turkey  98
Notes:  Average  density  is 376 wral people per square amable  kilometer.
How do the regressions  with the sample  divided  by "land  poor' and "land  rich"  behave?
Not very well. In table  6 the estimated  effect is more severe  in the land rich han the land poor
counties.  In the multivariate  regressions  the effect was even positive  for the land poor (.21)
while  negative  (-.10)  in the land  rich (although  again,  both are isignificant). Since  creating  this
empmical  division  into  land  rich and land poor was a major  part of the research  and  franldy,  our
best idea, this lack in intfitive  results  is very disappointing.26
Table 6:  Partial Correlation of Labor Force Growth with Growth Rate
of Output per Worker, 1960-1990. Sample Divided  by Land Scarcity.
Control  None  Y0  Y0,BMP,LLY,XS  N
variables:
All  -.10  -.12  0.04  79
(.37)  (.28)  (.73)
Land Poor  -.05  -.03  0.21  38
(w/o  -(.77)  (.85)  (.24)
Singapore)
Land Rich  -.21  -.29  -.10  40
(.20)  (.07)  (.57)
Notes: p-levels  of test for zero correlaton in parenthesis.
C)  Changes  in the results  over time
A fnal way in which  the iupact of population  may vaiy is over time.  The difference
in the correlation  in the 1980s  has been widely noted. However,  it is very difficult  to interpret
what tbis time-varying coefficient  may mean if the shift cannot be empirically related to some
underlying  time varying vanable. That is, it may be that the impact  of population  growth is
worse at higher  densities,  and that population  density  has been increasing  over time. But if that
were the case  is should  be possible  to control  in the regressions  for shifting  density  and  eliminate
the exogenous  time shift..
In any case in our present  results  using labor force growth  the effect is in fact larger in
the 1980s,  although  not statistically  significant. This is consistent  with other fmdings,  such  as
Kelley  and Schmidt,  1994  and Brander  and Dowrick, 1994. However,  what this rsut  for the
1980s  implies  about the evolution  of the futire impact of population  growth  is unclear. Will the
impact of population  growth  in the 1990s  be like that of the 1970s  or 1960s  or like that of the27
1980s? Unless one can identify  dhe  empirical reason for the shifting coefficient  in the 1980s the
finding is interesting, but uninformative.  That is, if the worse impact of population  growth in
the 1980s were due to greater density as population grew this density  effect should appear in dhe
cross sectional results.  As it is, one has no idea why the  mpact may be different in the 1980s.
Table 7:  rartial  Correladon  of Labor  Force Growth  iwith  Growth Rate of
Output  per Worker.  Developing country  sample.  Regression by decade.
Control  None  Yo,BMP,  LY,X  N
variables:  S
All  0.15  0.16  0.10  56
(.25)  (.24)  (.48)
1960-70  0.12  0.11  0.12  56
(.38)  (.43)  (.41)
1970-80  0.06  0.02  0.001  56
(.67)  (.90)  (.99)
-1980-90  -.11  -.10  -.18  56
(.40)  (.48)  (.19)
Notes:  p-levels of test for zero correlation in parenthesis.
Conclusion
The data say very  strongly that  labor  force  growth  bas a  very  small, empirically
insignificant association,  with the growth of output per worker.  However, very few who work
on population issues believes this average impact is tue  for all counties.  This is a justfiable
reaction, in part because  no one trust  the constraints forced on the data.  The usual econometric
formulation  presupposes  that the negative (or positive) effect of population growth should  be the
same everywhere. But we don't believe the negative affect of additional populaion will be the
same in Bangladesh  and in Canada, nor even the same in crowded Malawi or Rwanda as in
sparsely populated Zambia or Zaire.28
This paper has attempted to implement that intuition empirically to advance the debate
about the consequences of population growth.  Unfortunately, it did not make much progress.
The  results did  not give stikng  confirnation  to  any  of  the  plausible distinctions across
countries.  Our measure of resource scarcity is likely a major reason for this failure. However,
while our empirical measure has its defects and fails to produce satisfying results, it is a major
conceptaal improvement  over even more simple indicators, like population  density, and of course
even a greater improvement  over the literatre's  standard: nothing at all.
Identication  of the conditions under which population growth is a drag on economic
growth  (along with  of  course those countries  for  which population growth presents other
dangers, such as degradation  of critical environments) ought to be a pnrority. Efforts to reduce
population growth should  be concentated  in those countries in which the return to those efforts
are  anticipated to  be the highest and one  element of  a high return  is where the economic
problems imposed by additional  population growth are the most severe.  But this focus of effort
requires some ability to objectively  identify and quantify those countries for which population
growth will have the worst effects.  Although there have been many plausible conjectes  made
about where population growth will be bad (e.g. worse in poor countries, worse in land scarce
countries, worse with pborer policies) there currently is no empirical evidence at all to support
those conjectmus.  This is a major Lacunae  in our knowledge about population  and its impacts.29
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(source)  ._.




Brander k  Dowrick  YPC  -.02 -O1SI  .1  ItGDP. LRP, LRI2. Ranidom  efrects  107 DC's and  Popublion (1994)  (PWT5)  -.27. GLS (IV)  .7  L.PJPOP  wits S year  LDC's  Growth
___________________  .____.____._____  avoruges  (1960-85)  _  _
Kelley  and Schimdt  YPC  .34 (-.12)1  .63 (1.1)  yo,yo 2
1yo3,  1960-70  89 DCs and  Population (1994)  (PWT5.5)  .OD  (-.09)  .16 (1.1)  Densily,Iit(ropl).  1970-80  LDCs.  growth -1.57 (.06)  3.2 (.71)  (iiitpraction  of pop'l  1980-90
gcowdi widt yO
(iiheraction results
given  iit  parenmlesis)  . :
flarro (1991)  YPC  -.14  2.15  yO. SEC 0. PRTo.  1960-85  98 DC's &  Ncl Fertillty (PWT5)  GOVC/GDP, RlEVC,  LDC's
ASSN, IPPDP3V,  AP,
LAM
Mankiw, Romer &  GODP  per person  -.14  1.75  yO, II/DP,  SCIIOOI.  1960-85  non-oil  Growth of Weil (1992)  aged 15-64  population  aged (PWT5)  -.15  1.91  y0, IIGDP, SCIIOOL  non-oil  15-6S
intermediate
-.21  2.52  y0, ICOU, SCIIOOL  OECD
Landau (1986)  YPC  -.199  .93  1  COV (-ni-E). Yo.  1960-80  65 LDCs >  I  Populalion
.1idHxp/aDP,  MS,  7 year averages  mil. pop.  Growth
lgov Trend, iransfers,
school  enrollmnentt.
distance  _t) nearest
Ram (1986)  YPC  -.403  1.51  I/GDP, GOV  1960-70  94 LDCs  Populaion
Growth .. 306  .87  1970-80  . _
Diamond (1989)  YPC  -.78  1,32  I  1980-85  38 L.DCs  Labor Force .,  pub  _._  .CGrowlh
Cordoso & Fishlow  YPC  -.20  .93  I/&DP, X. m, DsQ.65  1950.80. five year  18 Latin  Labor Force (1989) (table 2, col  averages  American  Growth 5,  p.  13)  __.___  _____  . _  ,  _33
Skinner (1987)  YPC  -.658  I  1.27  OIL, COUPS,  lpyI  1965-82  31 African  Population
I  ToT, laxes  of  Growth
various types
Otani & Villa  Growlh of per  -1.13  1.62  S/GDP,  EdExp/GOV,  1970-R5  17 low income  Population
Nueva (1990)  capita real GNP  RIR, XIGDP  LDC's  Growth
(IMF4)  _ 
-1.32  1.78  15 middle
income LDC's
-.66  .74  23 upper
income LDC's
Grier & Tallock  YPC  -.66  1.47  yO, GOV, SIGDP,  1961-1980  using  43 SS African  Mean
(1989)  (SIt, PWT4)  INP, STDINP,  OPEC,  five year averages  'Population
-.339  1.04  LID  24 Latin  Am.  CGrowth
-.746  .91  22 Asia & Far
East
Kormendi  &  YPC  -.42  2.47  yO,  Sy, STDMS, MS,  1950-77  47 countriesDC  Population
Meguire (1985)  iMP  XIGDP, GOV,  INP  & LDC  Growth
-.37  2.17  _  _  _  _  _  _
Notes:  1)  Dependent variables, YPC: growth rate of GDP per capila.  Sources:  PWTXX indicates  various versions of tie  Penn World Tables, WB is World Bank national
accounts, wlile IMP indicates  IMP national accounts dtla.
2)  Control variables: YO,  initial Income; I/GDP, ralio of invesiment  to GDP; PRI (SUC),  primary (or secondary)  enrollment rale; COV, ralin government  spending to GDP;
SOC, dumiimy  for socialist economilies;  RHVC, revolutionis  & coups, AP, duimmy  for sub saliaran  Africa; LAM, dumnmy  for Latin America: XIGI)P, ratio exports to GDP.
GDC, growilt  of domestic credit; STDDC, standard devialion or domestic  credit; CVL, civil umrest;  SCHOOL, weighted  average primary and secondary  enrollment;  LRP. log
deviation  of output per worker from US levels-  LF/POP, ratio of labor force aged populalion  to tolal population:  DENSITY, ralio of land area to population.  SIGDP.  domestic
savings ratio; GOVC/QDP,  ratio of government  consumption  spending to GDP, ASSN, Assassinations,  IPPDEV, devialion  of investlmient  prices froin expected  level based on
income per capita; EdBxp/GOV,  fraction of govt. expentliture  on education; MS. growdli  of money supply; STDMS, standard deviaiion  of money supply; X/GDP,  ratio of
exports to GDP; RIR, real interest rate; Ipvt, private investment;  Ipub, public investment;  ToT, terms of trade shocks; LEX, life expectancy  at birth; INP. inflation;  STDINF,
standard deviation of innlation:  OPEC, dummy for OPEC; LID, dummy for lack of civil liberties.
3)  Net fertility is ferlility adjusted for infant mortality.
4) All coefficienis  reported in original sources are transformed  so tlat it indicates  the effect of an increase of one perceniage point in population  growilt on the growlh of output
per person per annum (i.e.,  if tlie coefficient is w38,  a  1% increase in population  growth reduces output  per person by .38% of percentage points).34
Appendix  Table A'-2:  Pardal Correlation  of Labor Force Growth  on Growth Rate of Output per Worker,  for
Various Samples  of Countries,  1960-1990
Control  None  Ya  YO.BM?,LLY,XS  N
variables:
All  -.10  -.12  0.04  79
(.37)  (.28)  (.73)
OECD  -.50  -.08  -.04  22
(.02)  (.07)  (.89)
Developing  0.15  0.16  0.10  56
______________  (.25)  (.24)  (.48)
Africa  -.01  0.02  -.09  19
(.98)  (.93j  (.73)
Latin  America  0.32  0.33  0.50  18
______________  (.20)  (.19)  (.07)
Asa/Pacific  0.60  0.66  0.75  12
(.04)  (.03)  (.03)
Low Income  0.05  0.07  -.05  24
(.83)  (.75)  (.82)
Middle  Income  -.12  -.12  -.02  32
i  _____________  (51)  (.53)  (.94)
Land  Poor  w/o  -.05  -.03  *0.21  39
SGP  (.77)  (.85)  -(.24)
Laund  Rich  -. 1-.29  -- 10  40
(.20)  (-07)  (.57)
Notes:  1)  Number in parenhesis is dh  p-levd of the ts  the-correlation is zero.
2)  Control  variables:  YO  is initial  income,  BMP  is the black  market  premim  LLY is the ratio  of liquid  Liabiiies  to
GDP, XS is the export  to GDP ratio.35
Appendix Table AZ-2: Partia  Correlaton or Labor Force Growth with Growth Rate of Output per Worker for various Samples
of Counties,  1960-1969.
Control  variables:  None  . 0 Y0*BMP.LLY.XS  N
All  -.26  -.07  79
_____________________  (.02)  (.03)  (.SS)
OECD  D  0.04  -.33  22
.___________  (.02)  (.84)  (.19)
Developing  0.12  0.11  0.12  56
.____________________  (.38)  (.43)  (.41)
Africa  -.06  -.03  -.20  19
(.90)  (-92)  (A9)
Lain  America  0.31  031  0.45  18
(.2  1)  (.2)  (.10)
AsWiPacific  0.62  0.70  0.82  12
(.03)  (.02)  (.01)
Low Income  0.05  0.02  -.19  24
(.83)  (.92)  (.43)
Middle  Income  -28  -.31  -. 7  32
(.13)  (.09)  (.39)  .
Land Poor  -.20  9  . -.08  38
wto SGP  (.21).  (26)  (.67)
Land  Rich  -.30  -.32  0.09  40
. (.05)  (.05)  (.62)  -
Notes: 1) Number in parenEhesis  is the p-level  of the test the  correlation  is zero.
2)  Control  variables:  YO  is init  incomre  BMP  is die  black  market  premiuna.  LLY is die  ratio  of liquid  liabUties  to GDP.  XS is the
exort wo  GDP  ratio.36
Appendix  Table A2-3: Partial Correlation  of Labor Force Growth with the Growth Rate of Output per Worker  for
Various  Samples of Countries,  1970-1979
Control variables:  None  YO  __-  YoBMP,LLY.XS  N
All  0.05  0.04  0.08  79
__________________  (.67)  (.76).  (.48)
OECD  -.22  -.08  0.12  22
(.33)  (.72)  (.64)  _
Developing  -0.06  0.02  M.M)  -56
___________  ~(.67)  (.90)  (.99)
.03  0.01  0.03  19
(.89)  (.96)  (.90)
Latn America  0.13  0.22  0.08  18
:_________________ (.60)  (.40)  (.81)
AsianPacific  0.17  0.08  0.47  12
(.59)  (.81)  (.24)
Low  Iicome  -.03  -.03  0.04  24
(.90)  (.90)  (.87)
Middle  Income  -.06  -.02  -.10  32
(.74)  (.93)  (.62)
Land  Poor  0.07  0.09  0.02  38
W/l  vo SGP  (-67)  - (.59)  *(.92)  I
Land  Rich  0.04  -.01  0.20  40
(.83)  (.97)  (.24)  _
Notes: 1) Number  in parenthesis  is the p-level  of the test the correlation  is zero.
2)  Control  variables:  YO  is inital income,  BMP  is the black  market  premium,  LLY is the ratio of liqui liabilities  to GDP.  XS
is the export  to GDP  ratio.37-
I  Appendlz Table A2-4:  bPartial  Correlaton  of Labor Force Growth with Growth Rate of Output  per
Worker for Various Samples  of  Countries, 160-1990
Control  varables:  None  YO  Yo. BMP, LLY, XS  N
All  -. 23  -.23  -.27  79
(.04)  (.04)  (.02)
OECD  -. 43  -.46  -.59  22
._____________  __  (.05)  (.04)  (.01)
Developing  -.. I  -.10  -.18  56
(.40)  (.48)  (.19)
Africa  0.05  0.08  0.11  19
(.85)  (.74)  (.69)
Laun  America  -.18  -.19  -.26  18
(.48)  (.47)  (.37)
Asia/Pacific  -.33  -.33  -.23  12
(.30)  (.32)  (3S7)
Low Income  -.04  0.01  0.12  24
(.85)  (.98)  (.61)
Middle lxcome  -.15  -.15  -.33  32
(.42)  .43)  (.08)
Land Poor  -.15  -21  -.17  39
wIo SGP  (.38)  (.20) ..  (.33)
Land Rich  -.42  -.25  -.36  39
(.01)  (.14)  (.04)
Notes:  1)  Number in parenthesis  is the p-level  of the te  dhe  correlation is zero.
2)  Control  variables:  YO is inital income,  UMP  is the black market premium, LLY is the ratio of liquid
liabiliies to GDP, XS is the export to GDP raio.Policy  Research Working  Paper Series
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